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well-known cases in their comext and brings new
ones to lighc. Thus, Michael Van Alstine's chapter
covering treaties from 190 1 to 1945 convincingly
shows that Missouri v. Holland "actually plowed
very little new constitutional ground," (p. 199)
with its canonic status resting instead on its syn
thesis and expression of existing doctrines. That
chapter also highlights largely forgotten cases like
Fok Young Yo v. United States, which held that a
treaty can delegate regulatory authority to the
executive branch. Paul Stephan's chapter on trea
ties from 1946 to 2000 makes the imeresting
observation that, though during this period the
Court noted the principle that deference is owed
to the views of the executive branch when imer
preting treaties, the Court often did not, in prac
tice, state or apply this principle, especially on
issues of private law.These are only a few examples
of the fine-grained insights that come out of the
book's methodological approach.
The book's most important comribution is in
its identification of broader doctrinal themes. The
authors of the separate chapters provide a clear
doctrinal narrative, and a final chapter by Sloss,
Ramsey, and Dodge ties these narratives together.
They find that the Supreme Court's approach to
treaties was largely continuous from the Founding
through World War II, bur that the Court has sub
sequently displayed "newfound reluctance to use
treaties as a tool to constrain government power"
(p. 592)-in particular, by changing the canons of
interpretation that it relies upon and by increasing
the barriers to judicial enforcement of treaties.For
customary international law, they deem the story
"more cyclical" (p. 594), with direct application of
customary international law strong until the early
twentieth cemury but then limited umil the
revival of the Alien Tort Statute.1 They conclude
that the Court has frequently used international
1 This book was published before the Supreme
Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 5. Ct. 1659 (2013), which has reduced the pros
pects for litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. Kiobel
was the subject of an International Decision in the July
2013 issue of AJIL; the Agora "Reflections on Kiobel"
was published in the Ocrober 2013 issue; and the Agora
was extended in January 2014 with the online publi
cation of AJIL UNBOUND. The entire set of articles
is available at http://www .asil.org/resources/american
journal-international-law.
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law in both constitutional and statutory imerpre
tation across all four time periods, but with vari
ations in how much it is used and in whether
it furthers or constrains governmental power. By
drawing these overall conclusions, the editors map
the cominuity and change that they have docu
mented-and do so in a way that will help scholars
put new developmems in Supreme Court practice
.
.
m perspective.
The analysis in the book is especially useful
because it comes with powerful markers of credi
bility. If ever there was a book with built-in checks
and balances, this is ic. To begin with, prior work
by the editors and authors demonstrates that they
are a widely mixed group in terms of their norma
tive and interpretive approaches. But the book
does not simply depend on these differences to
smooth out its content. Instead, it affirmatively
seeks out self-criticism by including a number of
chapters that are effectively book reviews of the
book itself (with each review targeted at, and con
tained in, a particular section of the book). John
Fabian Witt, Edward Purcell, and Martin Flaherty
contribute chapters assessing the contributions for
particular time periods. Witt, in particular, does
not hesitate to dish out criticism. The final section
of the book relies even more strongly on back-and
forth, with lead essays on recent Supreme Court
cases immediately followed by response essays cri
tiquing those essays.All this internal engagement
signals that, in keeping with the best scholarly tra
dition, the authors have "kept [their] mind[s]
open to criticism" and followed the practice of "lis
ten [ing] to all that could be said against [them] ."2
Wirh the book's focus on providing excellent
doctrinal history, however, comes an inevitable
insularity. It conveys a good sense of what the
Supreme Court has done in cases involving inter
national law, but there is little overall account of
why. Is the Court acting out of fidelity to doctrinal
and interpretive traditions? Is it responding to his
torical context, to perceived functional needs, to
developments in the political branches? Do theo
ries from international relations explain-or fail
to explain-aspects of the continuity and change
documented here? Witt's chapter raises many
2 jOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 12 (1859)
(1921 ed.).
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of these questions (and emphasizes the book's
absence of social history), bur the book as a whole
does not attempt to answer them.3
We do get tantalizing hints of cause and effect
in some of rhe individual chapters.Writing about
treary cases between the Civil War and 1900, for
example, Duncan Hollis observes that during this
period there developed "a more nuanced-and
some might say less respectful-vision of treaties'
place in the U.S. constitutional system" (p. 56)
than had been present earlier. Hollis offers some
possible lines of explanation, and observes that
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This is an exceptionally lively era of Supreme
Court engagement with international law.
Between 2000 and the publication of this book
in 2011, the Supreme Court decided lvfedellin v.
Texas, Sosa v. A!varez-Machain, Roper v. Simmons,

F Hoffinan La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., and

Hamdan v. Rumsftld-all of which, among others
from the same period, are discussed in the book's
final section.And since 2011, the Supreme Court
has continued its busy streak, with the last few
years bringing Kiobe! v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
more cases from the war on terror, and the pending
many ofthe treaties adjudicated during this period Bond v. United States. Overall, the Court's deci
were between the United States and Indian tribes sions have reflected a new assertiveness, marked by
or non-European nations with whom "the United its willingness to go against the positions taken by
States frequently held rhe upper hand" (p. 59) the executive branch and to revisit its precedents.
One way to evaluate the import of the doctrinal
and might harbor racial bias against-unlike ear
lier treaty cases involving European nations. history presented in International Law in the US.
Other essays in the book also explore how power Supreme Court is to ask whether and how that his
dynamics may influence the Court's jurispru tory informs the book's final section, with irs five
dence, such as an elegant opinion piece by Ralf separate exchanges-each having a lead essay and
Michaels on F Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empa two essays in response-on recent Supreme Court
cases. The answer is mixed, as these exchanges
gran S.A. (a 2004 extraterritoriality decision), but
it is a theme left to individual authors to pursue or showcase both the benefits and the limits of that
nor, and thus is only intermictencly present in the history.
Consider the essay by Mark Tushnet and the
book.
responses
by Roger Alford and Melissa Waters, all
It is true rhat rhis book is primarily about
doctrinal history and that a broader narrative is dealing with Roper v. Simmons and other recent
Supreme Court cases using non-U.S. sources in
beyond its scope. Indeed, the editors say just that
constitutional
interpretation-an issue of ongo
in their introduction w the book. Yet the book
plainly seeks to link up the past with the present, ing academic debate. Tushnet argues that this
as shown by the decision to include a final section practice "was entirely routine throughout U.S.
of opinion essays on recent Supreme Court cases. constitutional history" and that "[w]hat has
Without a broader narrative, however, the book changed is that ... [it] became controversial at the
provides little basis for projecting into the turn of the twenty-first century" (p.511).He attri
future-for example, what Supreme Court juris butes this controversy to the rise of originalism
prudence in relation to international law is likely and, more hesitantly, to "anxieties about the
to be in 2050 or even 2020.The book will be espe nation's position in the international community"
(p. 516). Alford challenges the use of non-U.S.
cially valuable, however, as an aid in constructing
sources
as inherently problematic because of the
arguments rooted in doctrinal precedem and in
risks
of
cherry-picking. He considers Tushnet's
understanding how those precedents apply to con
argumem about current anxieties to be "novel but
temporary legal problems.
unconvincing, " considering that if "the debate
is really about national identity, we should have
3 See also Mary L. Dudziak, Toward a Geopolitics of
the History ofInternational Law in the Supreme Court, been having this argumenr long ago " (p. 521).
105 ASIL PROC. 532, 534-37 (2011) (critiquing the
Waters observes that, though the Supreme Court
book as failing to engage adequately with the relation
has used non-U.S.sources in constitutional inter
ship between the Cold War and the Supreme Court's
pretation in the past, what is unique about Roper
jurisprudence).
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and other recent cases is that they belong to an
"emerging transnational judicial dialogue among
the world's constitutional courts on human rights
issues " (p.523).
The doctrinal history revealed earlier in this
book establishes that the Supreme Court has used
international law in constitutional interpretation
for centuries before Roper. As Sarah Cleveland
wrote in an article engaging in a similar historical
analysis, this precedent "answers the legitimacy
objection that international law is 'foreign' to the
American constitutional tradition."4 Tushnet and
Waters build upon this established fact, and
Alford does not challenge it.Indeed, the doctrinal
history set forth in this book goes further by estab
lishing that the use of international human rights
law in U.S.constitutional interpretation goes back
well before the current controversies.Independent
of whether prior use of international law in inter
preting constitutional issues like war and sover
eignty supports its use in the human rights con
text, the practice has been around in relation to
human rights for over half a century.Trop v. DulLes
and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez are the leading
examples from the 1950s and 1960s.
Yet even from a doctrinal perspective, the his
tory covered in this book is not perfectly suited for
grounding the current debate. In some ways it is
roo broad.The coverage of every Supreme Court
case dealing materially wit� the use of interna
tional law in constitutional interpretation is of
great interest from a scholarly perspective, but it
does not lend itself all that readily to how public
debate is conducted.That is, both opinion pieces
and advocacy positions are likely to rely upon the
cases that, for whatever reason, are already known
and conceptualized as part of the canon. This is
perhaps a fault of advocacy, bur it is one that schol
arship must contend with in order to have an
impact. For example (one taken from the book
itself), in choosing historical examples to illustrate
his argument, Mark Tushnet relies on the "Bran
deis Brief" (in Mufler v. Oregon), Justice Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence, and Kennedy v. Men
doza-Martinez for their use of comparative or
international law.All of these examples are cov4

Sarah

H.

Cleveland, Our International Constitu

tion, 31 YALE].

INT'L L

l, 7 (2006).
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ered previously in International Law in the US.
Supreme Court, but they have also featured previ
ously in scholarly debate.The first two, in partic
ular, have already gained positions of prominence
in our constitutional narrative. It remains to be
seen whether some of the less notable cases covered
in this book will influence the present debate.
In other ways, the doctrinal history covered in
this book leaves the story of international law's
place in constitutional interpretation incomplete.
It does not, for example, cover the use of inter
national law in constitutional interpretation by
the political branches of governmenr.5 Nor does it
cover historical debates over the use of non-U.S.
sources by domestic courts other than the
Supreme Court.Drawing on the doctrinal history
set forth in this book, Tushnet finds the backlash
against the use of non-U.S. sources in constim
tional interpretation to be a novel development.
And so it is, based upon this doctrinal history, bur
a broader perspective on rhe role of non-U.S.
sources in domestic courts- one going outside
the context of the Supreme Court and constitu
tional interpretation-may offer more analogies.
If anything, today's backlash brings to mind the
resistance by state legislatures and some state
courts to citing English case law in the early nine
teenth century-a backlash occasioned in part by
anti-English and pro-French sentiment. At that
rime, "(u]nder the influence of such ideas, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Kentucky legislated
against citation of English decisions in the
courts.... [A]nd more than one judge elsewhere
had his fling at the English authorities cited before
him."6
In short, the doctrinal history in this book pro
vides valuable guidance on the issue of using inter
narional law in constitutional interpretation. But
because the book is limited to Supreme Court
cases and avoids broader social-science and histor
ical narratives, its account provides neither a full
doctrinal picture nor an underlying explanation of
5 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the
Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REv. 987,

1008-32 (2013) (exploring how international law has
influenced how the political branches have interpreted
the separation of foreign affairs powers).
6 Roscoe Pound, The Pioneers and the Common Law,
27 W.VA. L.Q. I, 7 (1921).
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this picture. Nor does it answer the first-order
question of the extent to which prior doctrine and
practice should shape contemporary constitu
tional interpretation. The editors are explicitly
aware of these limits, but their significance
becomes most apparent when thinking about the
final section of essays in relation to the earlier por
tions of the book.
It will thus be interesting to see how practitio
ners use this book going forward. Regardless,
Sloss, Ramsey, Dodge, and the other authors have
provided an invaluable contribution to the schol
arship on the Supreme Court and international
law.
jEAN GALBRAITH

Rutgers Schoof ofLaw-Camden
Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human
Rights, and the Law ofthe Commons. By Burns

H. Weston and David Bollier. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp.
xxvi, 363.Index. $99.
From the beginning of the modern environ
mental movement in the 1960s, some activists and
scholars have argued that the environmental chal
lenges we face are roo large to be solved within our
existing legal and political framework, and that we
can meet them only by fundamentally changing
the way that we think about and act towards
natural resources. Sometimes called neo-Ma!thu
sians, they have argued not only, as Malthus did, 1
that a growing population will run short of food,
but also that we will exhaust non-renewable
resources.2 That global population growth has
greatly slowed in recent decades does not solve the
problem, in their view, because consumption con
tinues to rise at unsustainable rates. In the last
twenty years, climate change has become the
clearest example to many neo-Malthusians that
1 THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCI
PLE OF POPULATION (1798).
2 See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B: RESCUING
A PLANET UNDER STRESS AND A CIVILIZATION IN
TROUBLE (2003); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULA
TION BOMB (1968) ; GARRETT HARDIN, THE
OSTRICH FACTOR: OUR POPULATION MYOPIA
(1999); DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS
TO GROWTH (1 972).
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the world has natural, non-negotiable limits to
economic growth, which we cannot exceed with
out causing catastrophic damage to the environ
ment and to ourselves.
The idea that our current trajectory may lead to
environmental disaster has become part of popular
culture,3 but it has yet to convince us to change
course.No alternative to our growth-oriented eco
nomic system has achieved widespread support,
perhaps because none has seemed both environ
mentally satisfactory and politically viable. With
their new book, Burns Weston and David Bollier
aim to change that.They put forward a proposal
that they hope will lead to a revolution in environ
mental governance.
They begin by citing the apocalyptic projec
tions of writers such as James Lovelock, who pre
dicts that unchecked climate change may cause the
global population to drop below one billion by the
year 2100 (p.xvii).4 Weston and Bollier blame our
situation on the failures of "the neoliberal State
and Market alliance that has shown itself, despite
impressive success in boosting material output,
incapable of meeting human needs in ecologically
responsible, socially equitable ways" (p. 3).Their
criticism of the Market is the familiar one that it
does not internalize environmental costs; their
criticism of the State is that it is unwilling or
unable to protect natural resources from the
Market. They point to many reasons for this fail
ure, including that "there is a cultural consensus
that the mission of government is ...to promote
development through constant economic
growth," (p. 10) and that "the State is too inden
tured to Market interests and too institutionally
incompetent to deal with the magnitude of so
many distributed ecological problems" (p. 20).
Having brieBy sketched the picture of a rapidly
deteriorating environment, plundered by a rapa
cious Market that the State is helpless to regulate,
the authors spend the rest of the book presenting
an alternative to the current political/legal system.
3

Recenr films depicting a future environmental

dystopia include A. I. A rtificial Inrelligence (2001); The
D ay After Tomorrow (2004); Wall-E (2008) ; M etropia
(2009) ; and Elysium (2013)
GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE
4 See j EFF
PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AUDAClOUS
QUEST TO FIX EARTH'S CLIMATE 89-90 (2010) .

